The Freedom of Information Act and the NLRB by Samoff, Bernard & Falkin, Jeffrey C
Boston College Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 6 Number 6 Article 4
7-1-1974
The Freedom of Information Act and the NLRB
Bernard Samoff
Jeffrey C. Falkin
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernard Samoff and Jeffrey C. Falkin, The Freedom of Information Act and the NLRB, 15 B.C.L. Rev.
1267 (1974), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol15/iss6/4
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND THE NLRB
BERNARD SAMOFF *
JEFFREY C. FALKIN **
The Freedom of Information Act' (FOIA), enacted by Congress
on July 4, 1966, was part of an historical sweep in the 1960's to strip
away the secrecy and mystery of governmental activities. It is de-
signed to open up agency records, avoid agency actions based on
covert documents, and provide public access to the voluminous
information gathered, processed and used by federal agencies.
It is the purpose of the present bill .
	 . to establish a
general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless infor-
mation is exempted under clearly delineated statutory lan-
guage . . . Success lies in providing a workable formula
which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests,
yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure. 2
The past and future impact of the FOIA upon the NLRB
depends upon: the agency's voluntary action; the nature and number
of requests from labor lawyers and academic researchers; and
elucidating litigation. What the NLRB has done, how it has re-
sponded under the FOIA to opening up its records, what demands
have been made upon it, and how the courts have interpreted and
applied the FOIA to the NLRB provide an opportunity for examin-
ing law in action. The FOIA is a living law and the NLRB's almost
45,000 annual case intake is an operational reality affecting many
aspects of labor-management relations in the United States. Hence
public law and public policy confront each other when we explore
the FOIA and the NLRB.
Before indicating the scope of this article, it should be noted
that the NLRB, unlike other federal agencies, operates in a con-
troversial and highly value-committed environment in which both
* B.S, and Ed. M., Temple University; M.A. and Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania;
Regional Director of Region 4 (Philadelphia) National Labor Relations Board.
** B.S., Cornell University; J.D., Syracuse University, College of Law; L.L.M.,
Georgetown University, Law Center; Field Attorney, National Labor Relations Board;
Member of the New York Bar. The views expressed herein by the authors are their own and
must not be taken as the official pronouncement of the N.L.R.13. or its General Counsel.
1
 Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, codified in its present form in
1967, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). The codification substantially changed the Act's format. Refer-
ence will be made to the codified version as found in 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970); however, the
legislative history, as well as several commentaries, discuss the Act in the originally enacted
version.
2 S. Rep. No, 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) (hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 813).
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pro-union and anti-union sentiments are strongly held. Collective
bargaining and unionism have been idealized by some and severely
criticised by others. The nature of the NLRB's clientele, the interac-
tion of unions, management and the public, and the processes and
institutions which have evolved shape American labor laws with a
unique character. 3
Faced with this reality, the NLRB must move nimbly and
delicately, particularly in its efforts to resolve seemingly incompati-
ble statutory goals. It is not uncommon for the NLRB to prosecute
an employer for unfair labor practices charged by a union, and,
simultaneously, to prosecute the charging union for unfair labor
practices charged by the same employer. Realistic and constructive
discussion and analysis of the FOIA in relation to the NLRB require
appreciation of the NLRB's unusual position with respect to man-
agement, unions and the public.
To consider this subject in a systematic and useful way we have
arranged the paper in four sections: (1) overview of the FOIA; (2)
litigation involving the FOIA and the NLRB; (3) analysis; and (4)
emerging themes.
SYNOPSIS OF THE FOIA
The purpose of the statute is to protect the right of the public to
information. 4 It requires federal agencies and departments to make
available to the public all government records except those
3 For a brief but lucid discussion of the environment in which American labor laws are
administered, see Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1394 (1971)
Justice White writing for the majority in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), explained
the reason for the enactment of this Act:
The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, is a revision of § 3, the public
disclosure section, of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1002. Section 3
was generally recognized as falling short of its disclosure goals and came to be looked
upon more as a withholding statute than a disclosure statute. [Citations omitted.] The
section was plagued with vague phrases, such as that exempting from disclosure
"any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest."
Moreover, even "matters of official record" were only to be made available to
"persons properly and directly concerned" with the information. The provisions of
the Freedom of Information Act stand in sharp relief against those of § 3. The Act
eliminates the "properly and directly concerned" test of access, stating repeatedly
that official information shall be made available "to the public," "for public inspec-
tion." Subsection (b) of the Act creates nine exemptions from compelled disclosures.
These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, 5 U.S.C. § 552(c), and are plainly
intended to set up concrete, workable standards for determining whether particular
material may be withheld or must be disclosed. Aggrieved citizens are given a
speedy remedy in district courts, where "the court shall determine the matter de
novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).
Noncompliance with court orders may be punished by contempt. . .
Id. at 79.
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specifically named in one or more of the nine exemptions. 5 This
places the burden upon the agencies, not the public. We need not
inquire why the public needs the information, but rather why the
information should not be available to the public.°
FOIA section 552(a) begins with the directive in subparagraph
(1) that "each agency . . . publish in the Federal Register" (A)
descriptions of organization and function and means by which peo-
ple may request information; (B) statements of both "formal and
informal procedures"; (C) rules and regulations; (D) substantive
rules of general applicability; and (E) all amendments and revisions
to the above.? And, except when actual and timely notice is given,
"no person" will be required to resort to, or be adversely affected
by, matter "required" to be published in the Federal Register which
is not published. 8
Subparagraph (a)(2) concerns Agency Opinions and Orders and
requires agencies to make available "for public inspection and copy-
ing" (A) all final opinions, (B) statements of policy and interpreta-
tions not published in the Federal Register, and (C) administrative
staff manuals and instructions affecting "any" member of the
public. 9
 However, an agency may delete identifying details to pre-
vent "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," provided there is
justification for such deletion. 1 ° Further, a "current index" provid-
ing "identifying information" is to be kept on "any matter which is
issued, adopted, or promulgated after the effective date." 11
Subparagraph (a)(3)' 2
 provides for a general right of public
access to government records: "each agency, on request for
identifiable records . . . shall make the records promptly available to
any person." If the agency should improperly withhold such records,
the district court of the United States "[shall have] jurisdiction to
enjoin the agency." 13
 "In such a case the court shall determine the
matter de novo and the burden shall be upon the agency to sustain
its action." 14
 Such proceedings are to be "expedited in every way,"
and given precedence over all other causes before the court except
Id.
Commentators have analyzed exhaustively each provision of the FOIA. Most extensive
is the 47-page Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the
Administrative Procedure Act (GPO 1967). See also K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise,
at 114-80 (Supp., 1970).
5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1)(A}-(E) (1970).
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970).
9 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1970).
m 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1970).
1 Id.
12 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
' 3 Id.
14 Id.
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for those that in the court's discretion it "considers of greater
importance." 15
 Finally in the last subparagraph, (a)(4), 16 the agen-
cies are required to keep public records of the final votes of each
member participating in agency decisions.
Section 552(b)' 7 sets forth a series of exemptions limiting the
broad disclosure requirements of subsection (b). However, the stat-
ute admonishes in subsection (c)," that only the subsection (b)
exemptions, "specifically stated," shall justify the "withholding of
information or limiting the availability of records to the public."
Exempt are matters which are: (1) "specifically required by execu-
tive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or
foreign policy"; (2) related to "internal personnel rules and prac-
tices"; (3) exempted specifically by statute from disclosure; (4) "trade
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from any
person and privileged or confidential"; (5) "inter-agency or intra-
agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by
law to a private party in litigation with the agency"; (6) personnel,
medical, and "similar files" whose disclosure would be "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"; (7) "investigatory files
compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent avail-
able by law to a party other than an agency"; (8) "contained in or
related to examination, operating, or conditions reports prepared
by" or for an agency regulating or supervising financial institutions;
and (9) geographical and geological information concerning wells."
This overview of the FOIA indicates its principal aspects and
demonstrates the obligations of agencies to make their records avail-
able to the public. The FOIA establishes certain standards required
of agencies to comply with the statute, but also identifies specific
exemptions. The Act indicates that Congress sought to achieve a
balance between the public's right to know and an agency's need to
maintain confidential records. Congress demonstrated recognition of
the fact that agencies were empowered to carry out important public
functions which could be impaired unless a line were drawn be-
tween accessible and inaccessible information. And most impor-
tantly, Congress did not want to disclose to the public, confidential
matters relating to private persons.
LITIGATION INVOLVING THE FOIA AND THE NLRB
Although the NLRB has taken steps to satisfy the requirements
of the FOIA, 2° its actions have not been deemed adequate by all
" Id,
16 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1970).
17 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).
La 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)49) (1970).
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parties. Clearly, the clientele 21
 dealing regularly with the NLRB
would be most concerned with access to information. Within this
category, management, more often than unions, has challenged the
Board under the FOIA. Some have suggested that management is
using the FOIA as a tactical device to serve its interests. But it
should be noted that special-interest litigation may also serve the
public interest.
Litigation directed at obtaining NLRB disclosure under the
FOIA has increased in the past few years and has met with varying
degrees of success. To discuss the litigation, we have divided it into
five areas: (1) advice and appeals memoranda prepared by the
regional offices and Washington; (2) indices of Board and regional
representation case decisions; (3) evidence gathered by the regions
while investigating both unfair labor practice and representation
cases; (4) public availability of Excelsior lists 22 and (5) NLRB forms.
Before discussing the substantive developments resulting from
the decisions to date, we want to emphasize a corollary aspect of
these cases. Plaintiffs have regularly sought not only specific infor-
mation which the Board allegedly had to provide under the FOIA,
but also an injunction restraining the Board from further processing
" When the FOIA became effective the Board made public a modified version of the
manual used by agency employees in the regional offices, the "Field Manual," excluding from
it portions which the agency concluded were exempt from disclosure. A Memorandum to the
Board and the General Counsel prepared by a committee composed of senior agency person-
nel (Committee on Implementation of Public Information Act), and circulated at about the
time the Field Manual was made public, states that it was the belief of the committee that
other manuals such as the Legal Assistant's Manual, the Trial Examiner's Manual, and the
Hearing Officer's Manual were not required to be made public, (Permission to refer to this
memorandum has been issued by the NLRB, along with a disclaimer to the effect that the
memorandum does not necessarily reflect either the current thinking or the current procedures
of the Board, but rather, reflects the views of that Committee at that time.") Subsequently,
however, the Board has released a public version of the Trial Examiner's Manual and is
expected this year to release the entire "Field Manual." It is also expected that this year a
guide to Law and Procedure in Representation Cases prepared by the General Counsel for use
by regional office staff will be made public.
Items now required to be disclosed by the FOIA which the NLRB had made available to
the public prior to the enactment of FOIA include: (1) decisions of the Board in representation
and complaint cases; (2) the field manual; (3) records of votes of members; and (4) an index of
Board decisions. Regional Directors' decisions in representation cases were, and are, available
at the regional office where issued,
21 Although the term "public" is used frequently throughout this article, it is obvious that
those who are most concerned with the interplay between the FOIA and the NLRB are the
Board staff and the lawyers representing management and unions. Concededly, these people
constitute a modest number of the entire "public," even though anyone from a rank-and-file
worker to a senior member of a prestigious law firm has an equal right of access to NLRB
information.
22 These election eligibility lists contain the names and addresses of all eligible voters and
must be filed with regional directors within seven days of an agreement or stipulation for
election, or after the Board or regional director directs an election. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217
(1966).
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representation hearings and unfair labor practice trials pending dis-
closure. Significantly, the courts have rejected such requests. 23
The reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB 24 is representative of
such decisions. The lower court had granted Sears' request for a
preliminary injunction. This order prevented further administrative
processing pending resolution of the issue of the Board's duty to
make available, for public examination, Advice and Appeals
memoranda prepared by the Office of the General Counsel for the
guidance of Regional Directors. 25
 The circuit court reversed and
remanded, concluding that Sears had failed to justify enjoining the
administrative process. 26
Although agreeing that the district court had authority to enjoin
agency proceedings until resolution of the FOIA claim, the circuit
court concluded that such action is only to be taken in "extraordi-
nary circumstances" when there is a clear showing of "irreparable
harm."27
 The latter is not to be established by "a mere" requirement
that a party will have to submit to an agency hearing. 28
 "This is a
risk of litigation that is inherent in society, and not the type of
injury to justify judicial intervention." 29 It therefore concluded:
In the case at bar we do not have a cogent showing,
indeed we do not see a substantial showing, of how Sears
will be irreparably harmed in its participation in the unfair
labor practice charge without the Advice and Appeals
memoranda whose disclosure is still under judicial consid-
eration. Sears was successful in seeking the issuance by the
Board of a complaint of unfair labor practice charge. 3 °
23 Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 85 L.R.R.M. 2250 (4th Or. 1974),
aff'g 82 L.R.R,M. 2857 (D.S.C. 1973); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 91, 81
L.R.R.M. 2481 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Polymers, Inc. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 999, 71 L.R.R.M. 3107
(2d Cir. 1969); Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. — F. Supp. —, 86 L.R.R.M. 2462 (M.D.
Fla. 1974); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 84 L.R.R.M. 2536 (D.D.C. 1973); Carrollton
Motor Inn v. NLRB, 84 L.R.R.M. 2385 (D.D.C. 1973); Elsing Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 82
L.R.R.M. 3054 (E. D. Okla. 1973); Teamsters Local 705 v. NLRB, 82 L.R.R.M. 3014
(D.D.C. 1973); Seattle Trade Council v. Henderson, 82 L.R.R.M. 2362 (W.D. Wash. 1973);
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. McLeod, 69 L.R.R.M. 2186 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Clement
Bros. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp, 540, 68 L.R.R.M. 1086 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Barceloneta Shoe
Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 65 L.R.R.M. 3063 (D.P.R. 1967). But see Automobile
Club v. NLRB, 84 L.R.R.M. 2423 (D.D.C. 1973).
24 473 F.2d 91, 81 L.R.R.M. 2481 (D.C. Or. 1972).
25 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 79 L.R.R.M. 2942 (D.D.C. 1972).
26 473 F.2d at 93, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2482.
' Id.
23 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. See, Hartford Fire Ins, Co. v. NLRB, — F. Supp. —, 85 L. R. R. M. 2750 (D.D.C.
1974).
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The court further stated, in what appears to be dicta, that in
the event Sears should be entitled to the documents
and should it appear that there was significant adverse
impact on Sears in the unfair labor practice charge pro-
ceedings because it was denied timely disclosure, an ap-
propriate remedy can be fashioned by the Board, or by the
court of appeals with jurisdiction of the petition for review
of enforcement in the event the Board issues an order. 31
However, the court in Automobile Club of Missouri v. NLRB 32
interpreted the circuit court's holding as follows:
It is not a matter of protecting A.C.M. against irreparable
injury, such as was presented on the preliminary injunc-
tion phases of the Sears Roebuck case, but rather of taking
an appropriate final injunctive step in equity to protect
Plaintiff from the obvious disadvantages under which it
labors, after weighing and balancing some of the counter-
vailing factors . . . . 33
1. Advice and Appeals Memoranda
Advice and Appeals Memoranda are prepared under the au-
thority of the General Counsel to "guide" the regional directors in
the issuance of complaints against parties charged with committing
unfair labor practices. 34
When a director concludes that a particular case raises novel
and unusual legal issues, the director may submit the case to the
Washington Advice Branch under the General Counsel. Respond-
ing, Advice informs the director, but not the parties, what action to
take with respect to the case. Sometimes, Advice may return the
case for either further investigation or analysis in light of new
NLRB or court decisions. The memoranda between the region and
Washington have been considered confidential for internal use.
The Washington Advice Branch may advise the director to
issue a complaint, in the absence of settlement, or to refuse to issue
a complaint. Where the director refuses to issue a complaint, either
after Washington's "advice" or on his own authority, the charging
party has the right to appeal the director's refusal to the General
Counsel and he may either sustain the director's action, return the
31
 473 F.2d at 93, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2482.
32
 84 L.R.R.M. 2423 (D.D.C. 1973).
33 84 L.R.R,M. at 2426.
34
 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 346 F. Supp. 751, 753, 80 L.R.R.M. 3428, 3429
(D.D.C. 1972).
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case for further investigation and analysis, or instruct the director to
issue a complaint in the absence of settlement. The Washington
Office of Appeals will prepare an Agenda Minute containing a brief
summary of the pertinent facts, analysis of the facts and law, and
conclusions. In some cases where the director is reversed and in-
structed to issue a complaint, the Minute may discuss the theory of
the case and how it is to be tried. At the time Appeals communicates
with the director, it also sends a letter to the parties indicating its
conclusions and reasoning.
Probably the most controversial and the best known litigation
involving the FOIA and the Board has also been the Sears, Roebuck
& Co. case. 35
 Sears filed an unfair labor practice charge in NLRB
Region 19 alleging that the Retail Clerks' International Union had
violated Section 8(b)(3) of the N.L.R.A. 36 Prior to the issuance of
complaint, Sears requested that the Board make available any Ad-
vice or Appeals memoranda prepared in relation to its charge. The
Board refused on the ground that such documents were intra-agency
memoranda and therefore exempt from disclosure under Section
552(b)(5). 37
 After the Director issued a complaint, Sears brought suit
in the Federal District Court, District of Columbia to force the
Office of the General Counsel to produce "Advice and Appeals
memoranda, and certain other materials incorporated by reference
therein."38
The district court concluded that the Advice memoranda are
"instructions mandatory in substance" and constitute "instructions
to staff that affect a member of the public" 39 (5 U.S.C. section
552(a)(2)(C), not exempted by section 552(b)(5) exempting intra-
agency memoranda). Similarly, the court found the Appeals
memorandum to be the "final determination of the General
Counsel's staff of the disposition of a charge" and, as such, not
exempt from disclosure by section 552(b)(5). 4° Finally, the court
concluded that "documents incorporated by reference in Advice and
Appeals memoranda, even though possibly qualified for a section
552(b) exemption taken separately, must also be disclosed, since
they have lost their exempt status by incorporation."4 i
Since the court concluded that the memoranda were not within
35
 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 346 F. Supp. 751, 80 L.R.R.M. 3428 (D.D.C. 1972),
aff 'd, 480 F.2d 1195, 83 L.R.R.M. 3045 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
36
 346 F. Supp. at 753, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3429.
37
 Id. at 753, 754, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3429, 3431.
39
 Id. at 752, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3429.
39
 Id. at 753, 80 L.R R.M. at 3431. See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 81
L.R.R.M. 2676 (D.D.C. 1972).
40
 346 F. Supp. at 754, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3430.
91
 Id., 80 L.R.R.M. at 3430-31.
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the exemptions of 552(b), it directed that these documents be made
available to Sears. It specified that: (1) when reference in Appeals
and Advice memoranda is made to the "circumstances" of the case
the General Counsel is to provide an explanation including docu-
ments except to the extent that the documents are exempt; (2)
references to parties, attorneys, prior memoranda, and all other
information referred to are to be made available except for deletions
justified in writing and the names of affiants; and (3) indices of the
Advice and Appeals memoranda must be provided to the public
from the effective date of the FOIA. 42
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed 43
 the trial court's
decision in a per curiam order citing the district court's opinion and
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board."
The Supreme Court has granted writ of certiorari to the Board. 45
Plaintiffs in other district court proceedings have not been so
successful in getting Advice and Appeals memoranda and materials
incorporated therein. In Seattle Trade Council v. Henderson," the
court rejected the union's effort to enjoin the General Counsel from
refusing to produce all Appeals and Advice memoranda and any
documents incorporated by reference which related specifically to
the allegations in the case that it violated Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the
NLRB, as amended. 47 The court concluded that such information
was intra-agency memoranda exempted under section 552(b)(5). 48
Similarly, in Elsing Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB the court denied49
42
 Id., 80 L. R. R. M. at 3431.
43
 480 F.2d 1195, 83 L.R.R.M. 3045 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Although the opinion was not
officially reported, it does appear in 83 L.R.R.M. 3045.
44
 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
43
 42 U.S.L.W. 3645 (U.S. May 28, 1974).
46
 82 L,R.R.M. 2362 (W,D, Wash. 1973).
42
 Id.
48 Id.
49
 82 L.R.R.M. 3054-55 (F.D. Okla. 1973). The Board's Memorandum in Kent Corp. v.
NLRB, Civil No. CA-73M1090 (N.D. Ala. 1974): states:
In any event, classification of both advice and appeals memoranda in closed cases on
the Class(fication Outline for Decision of the National Labor Relations Board and
Related Court Decisions is planned and will be made publicly available as soon as
completed. In the meantime, the Board has prepared a memorandum setting forth
the procedure for requesting advice and appeals memoranda in closed cases.
Kent Corp. v, NLRB, Civil No. CA-73M1090, at 3 n.2 (N.D. Ala., Jan. 2, 1974).
However in Teamsters Local 705 (Associated Transport, Inc.), 209 N.L.R.I3. No. 46, 86
L.R.R.M. 1119 (1974), the Board affirmed an Administrative Law Judge's revocation of a
subpoena duces tecum requiring the regional director to produce memoranda from the
General Counsel's Offices of Advice and Appeals relating to all closed "CB cases" involving
the Charging Party and Respondent:
(The subpoenaed (sic) documents relate only to collateral issues and are not material
to the case at bar. .. . Furthermore, in affirming his ruling, we would note that the
Board does not in any way consider or rely on the material sought in reaching its
decisions and, thus, did not have such before it in coming to its Decision and Order
herein. Assuming arguendo, however, that Respondent was entitled to these docu-
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plaintiff's request for the production of Advice and Appeals
memoranda and all information incorporated by reference therein
related to the Board's unfair labor practice then pending against the
plaintiff-employer. The court determined that such documents are
exempt from disclosure "during the pendency of litigation involving
the documents.""
2. Indices of Board decisions
The Board initially concluded that indices of unpublished
Board and Regional Director decisions did not have to be indexed or
digested as required by FOIA Section 552(a)(2)(C), because they are
not used by the Board or the directors as precedent." However, this
interpretation of the FOIA appears to be in question.
Judge Gesell in Automobile Club of Missouri v. NLRB 52 found
that in representation cases directors' decisions are final agency
determinations of some precedential value requiring preparation of
an index. Plaintiff had sought to enjoin representation proceedings
until the Board made available an index of directors' decisions
involving matters (i.e., a unit of insurance salesmen) similar to that
involved in the present proceeding. The Board had previously de-
nied a request for such an index. The judge's oral opinion concluded
that section 552(a)(2) specifically requires that "any matter which is
issued" must be indexed as to its substantive matter and made
available to the public." This section is applicable to directors'
decisions in representation proceedings since these decisions are
"final orders and opinions made in the adjudication of cases." 54
Although rejecting the Board's contention that the indexing required
merits regardless of their relevancy or nonuse by us, Respondent has not shown any
prejudice arising from the Administrative Law Judge's ruling.
209 N.L.R.B. No. 46 at 2 n.1, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1120. See Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.
— F. Supp.	 86 L.R.R.M. 2462 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
5° 82 L.R.R.M. at 3055. On February 3, 1972, General Counsel decided that all Advice
and Appeals memoranda in completed cases (cases where no complaint issued or Board has
taken final action) would be made available to the public. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB,
473 F.2d at 92 n.1, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2481 n.I (D.C. Cir. 1972).
51 Memorandum of the NLRB Committee on Implementation of Public Information Act,
note 20 supra, considered the indexing of regional directors' and unpublished Board decisions
in 1967. The committee thought the digesting system then in use adequate. "This covers only
such orders as the agency may wish to rely upon as precedent against a private party. Since
Regional Directors' decisions in representation cases which have not been reviewed on the
merits by the Board have no precedent value, they need not be indexed." Id. Likewise, an
"unpublished" decision of the Board "need not be indexed so long as the Board does not rely
on it as precedent against the party." Id. The committee recommended that both regional
directors' decisions and unpublished Board decisions should be available for inspection.
52 84 L.R.R.M. 2423, 2425 (D.D.C. 1973). See also Automobile Club v. NLRB, 84
L.R.R.M. 2422 (D.D.C. 1973).
53 84 L.R.R.M. at 2425.
54 Id. at 2424.
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is only applicable to decisions of precedent, Judge Gesell concluded
that the decisions are "by the preponderance of the evidence relied
on and used and cited as precedent within the meaning of the
Act."55
 Accordingly, he directed that an index be prepared and he
fashioned interim relief for the plaintiff. The Board was required to
prepare an index of cases, with issues similar to those in Automobile
Club, rendered by the regional director in whose jurisdiction the
representation hearing is to be held.s 6
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a
per curiam opinion, affirmed the ruling of the district court. It is
uncertain at time of writing whether the Board will seek review by
the Supreme Courts"'
In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 58
 another federal district
court judge for the District of Columbia concluded that the plaintiff
had failed to establish irreparable harm to justify a temporary
restraining order or an injunction postponing an unfair labor prac-
tice hearing until the NLRB complied with the FOIA requirement
that it keep an up-to-date index of its published and unpublished
decisions. The court concluded, relying on the Sears Roebuck case,
that the burden of submitting to an agency hearing does not estab-
lish irreparable injury since plaintiff can challenge any decisions
finally rendered by the Board" and further:
The Court concludes . . . that plaintiff's effort to
demonstrate irreparable injury is speculative. Standard
" Automobile Club v. NLRB, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2425. It is difficult to determine exactly
what the court relied on to make the determination. It relates that the decisions of the
Regional Director, according to the rules and regulations of the Board, are to be accorded no
precedent value, However, it was stated:
but the record does not disclose the extent to which Regional Directors may infor-
mally use or rely on prior decisions nor does it disclose in any great degree the extent
to which practitioners before the Board utilize these in the give-and-take of the
proceedings.
Id. at 2425. The court does note that in six months 34 out of 1005 regional director decisions
did make mention of other regional directors' decisions which normally involve the same
company.
More significantly, . . . the decisions are published, significant ones, at least, in
various summary forms in the Board's weekly summary of NLRB cases. .. [I)t is
apparent that the decisions are considered of public interest and the Board is
attempting to provide some limited identification to aid practitioner because of their
significance in the operation of the Board's processes.
Id. at 2425,
56
 The court declined to issue an injunction pending the preparation of the entire index,
which involved over 14,000 regional director decisions and was estimated to require a
minimum of six months work, since the delay would "stultify the Board in this and by
inference in other representation hearings and work hardship on parties entitled to prompt
determination of the appropriate bargaining unit." Id. at 2426.
— F.2d —, 86 L.R.R.M. 2064 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
59
 84 L.R.R.M. 2536 (D.D.C. 1973).
59 Id. at 2537.
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commercial indices, such as Prentice Hall and Commerce
Clearing House, report on a regular basis controlling
N.L.R.B. decisions which plaintiff has every right to be-
- lieve will be followed in the hearing set before the adminis-
trative law judge. . . . 60
3. . Materials in Investigatory Files
Several cases have involved attempts to require the Board to
reveal evidence gathered during informal investigations of unfair
labor practices or objections to NLRB-conducted representation
elections. In all instances the requests have been denied.
In Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 61 filed about one month
after the effective date of the FOIA, the employer sought to enjoin
the Board from commencing a formal unfair labor practice trial
until it was furnished statements and evidence adduced during the
informal investigation of the charge. The court concluded that the
seventh FOIA exemption relating to investigatory file materials was
applicable. The employer-plaintiff was not accorded any greater
right than given it by the Jencks Act, 62 which does not require
federal agencies in criminal proceedings to produce substantially
verbatim statements of witnesses obtained during investigation until
after witnesses give direct testimony at the trial. "To me, it is
inconceivable that by the new Act, Congress intended to give pri-
vate parties—employers, unions or employees—charged with the
violation of federal regulatory statutes any greater right to inspect
investigative file material, than has been granted to persons accused
of violating Federal criminal law."63
Finally, the court concluded that such statements obtained
during the investigation are privileged or confidential within the 4th
exemption:
persons interviewed by Board Agents in future investiga-
tions will not be as cooperative as they are now if they
know that the information they give to the Board agents
would be subject to public disclosure at any time before
they have actually testified at a public hearing. . . . Under
these circumstances the Defendant herein has shown a
better right to keep his commitment to the persons giving
such confidential statements, than have Plaintiffs made for
the disclosure of said documents prior to the hearing."
60 Id. at 2537.
6 ` 271 F. Supp. 591, 65 L.R.R.M. 3063 (D.P.R. 1967), cited with approval in Bristol-
Myers v, FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
62
 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
63
 271 F. Supp. at 593, 65 L.R.R.M. at 3065.
64
 Id, at 594, 65 L.R.R.M. at 3065-66.
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The Fourth Circuit followed the reasoning of Barceloneta Shoe
in NLRB v. Clement Brothers. 65 It rejected the employer's conten-
tion that the fairness of the unfair labor practice and prior represen-
tation proceedings were impaired by the Board's refusal to furnish
statements of persons who were interviewed in the prehearing,
informal investigation but were not called as witnesses. It approved
a prior unappealed district court ruling 66 that such statements were
within the seventh FOIA exemption and quoted the following:
It would seem axiomatic that if an employee knows
his statements to Board agents will be freely discover-
able by his employer, he will be less candid in his disclo-
sures. The employee will be understandably reluctant to
reveal information prejudicial to his employer when the
employer can easily find out that he has done so. . . . In
order to assure vindication of employee rights under the
Act, it is essential that the Board be able to conduct
effective investigations and secure supporting statements
from employees. We feel that preserving the confidentiality
of employee statements is conducive to this end. 67
In Wellman Industries, Inc. v. NLRB," the Fourth Circuit
reaffirmed the basic proposition underlying Clement. After the direc-
tor had set aside the results of the first election, in which the
employees rejected the, union because ,Wellman engaged in election
iregularities, a majority of Wellman's employees chose the union as
their bargaining representative at a second election. Wellman re-
fused to bargain and the director issued an unfair labor practice
complaint. Wellman sought to enjoin the Board from proceeding
further until it provided all affidavits obtained during the investiga-
tion of the union's objections to the first election and allegedly used
as the basis for the director's decision setting aside the first election.
The district court had denied Wellman's demand for access on
the ground that it was exercising its equitable discretion. 69 Although
the Fourth Circuit rejected the approach of the district court, it
affirmed the district court's denial of Wellman's request. According
to the circuit court, the lower court erred in attempting to balance
equities in applying the FOIA. 7 ° The FOIA grants to the district
65 407 F.2d 1027, 70 L.R.R,M. 2721 (5th Cir. 1969).
66 Clement Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540, 68 L.R.R.M, 2131 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
67
 407 F.2d at 1031, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2724, quoting from Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB,
336 F.2d 128, 134, 57 L.R.R.M. 2046, 2050 (5th Cir. 1964).
bLI 490 F.2d 427, 85 L.R.R.M. 2260 (4th Cir. 1974).
69
 82 L.R.R.M. 2857 (D.S.C. 1973). The district court subsequently reheard the
plaintiffs motion and affirmed its decision to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.
Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 82 L.R.R.M. 3069 (D.S.C. 1973).
7° 490 F.2d at 429. 85 L.R.R.M. at 2261.
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court no equitable discretion to deny disclosure of documents
beyond those contained in the statutory exemptions to the general
requirement of full public disclosure of all government documents. 71
The court considered it immaterial that the affidavits were obtained
in the investigation of a representation election:
Whether or not resulting in an unfair labor practice
charge, the Board's purpose here was to protect and vindi-
cate rights set out in Section 7. Though procedures vary, if
aimed at enforcement of the NLRA we think they are "for
law enforcement purposes" [within the meaning of the 7th
exemption]. 72
Further, the court noted that practicalities require the application of
the seventh exemption since failure to apply the latter would inhibit
employees from making statements freely and voluntarily and would
preclude "premature disclosure of an investigation so that the Board
can present its strongest case in court." 73 Finally, the court con-
cluded that Wellman must wait for final NLRB determination and
then pursue its right to review the NLRB's decision. 74
4. Public availability of Excelsior lists
Unquestionably the most unusual litigation involving the Board
and the FOIA concerns a request by two law school professors for
Excelsior lists in about thirty-five representation cases for use in a
behavioral study. The professors wanted to question employees
about their attitudes toward the electoral process, and to document
the impact of election tactics by employers and unions by interview-
ing employees before and after the elections. Contrary to the Board's
view that such lists need not be furnished in light of the fourth and
seventh exemptions in the FOIA, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Getman v. NLRB, 75 affirming the district
71 Id.
72 Id. at 430, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2262.
73
 Id, at 431, 85 L.R,R.M. at 2263.
74 Id. In Government Employees Ins. Co. v. McLeod, 69 L.R.R.M. 2186 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), plaintiff sought, among other items, statements and reports including information and
evidence which had served as the basis for the regional director's finding that the union had
the requisite 30% showing of interest in the representation proceeding. The court concluded
that plaintiff had failed to request this from the Executive Secretary of the Board or the
General Counsel, as required in the NLRB's Rules and Regulations, before initiating the
action in the district court. However, the court suggested that the Board should voluntarily
furnish to plaintiff a copy of any order, opinion or other document or documents serving as
the basis for determining that the Union had met the required showing of interest together
with any written statements or reports describing the evidence upon which such a determina-
tion was based. Id.
75 450 F.2d 670, 78 L.R.R.M. 2101 (D.C. Cir. 1971), application for stay denied, 404
U.S. 1204 (1971).
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court, 76 rejected the Board's contention that the fourth exemption
was applicable since:
this section exempts only (1) trade secrets and (2) informa-
tion which is (a) commercial or financial, (b) obtained from
a person, and (c) privileged or confidential. . . . Obviously,
a bare list of names and addresses which employers are
required by law to give the Board, without any express
promise of confidentiality, and which cannot be fairly
characterized as "trade secrets" or "financial" or "commer-
cial" information is not exempted from disclosure by Sub-
section (b)(4). 77
It also concluded that the seventh exemption was inapplicable:
The Excelsior lists are not files prepared primarily or even
secondarily to prosecute law violators, and even if they
ever were to be used for law enforcement purposes, it is
impossible to imagine how their disclosure could prejudice
the Government's case in court."
Having disposed of the fourth and seventh exemptions, the
court found the sixth exemption applicable. The latter, according to
the court, "requires a court reviewing the matter de nova to balance
the right of privacy of affected individuals against the right of the
public to be informed; and the statutory language 'clearly unwar-
ranted' instructs the court to tilt the balance in favor of
disclosure." 79
Balancing the invasion of privacy through disclosure of work-
ers' names and addresses with the public interest benefits gained
from such a study, the court found that:
although a limited number of employees will suffer an
invasion of privacy in losing their anonymity and being
asked over the telephone if they would be willing to be
interviewed in connection with the voting study, the loss of
privacy resulting from this particular disclosure should be
characterized as relatively minor (footnotes omitted)."
76 77 L.R.R.M. 3063 (D.D.C. 1971).
77 450 F.2d at 673, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2103, quoting Consumers Union of United States,
Inc, v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
78
 450 F.2d at 673, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2103.
79
 Id. at 674, 78 L. R. R. M. at 2103-04. In a footnote the court states that the balancing of
equities required by exemption 6 is an exception to the general thrust of the FOIA denying the
district courts the exercise of equitable discretion in determining whether agency records must
be disclosed. Id. at 677 n.24, 78 L.R.R.M, at 2106 n.24.
80 450 F.2d at 674-75, 78 L. R. R.M, at 2104 (footnotes omitted).
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Unlike the NLRB, whose interpretation and application of the
FOIA persuaded it that the confidentiality of voters' names and
addresses was of higher priority than a rare, systematic,
well-financed and conceptually innovative empirical study intended
to assist the Board and enhance the public interest, the court en-
dorsed the usefulness of the study for improving the Board's election
procedures because:
The public interest need for such an empirical investiga-
tion into the assumptions underlying the Board's regulation
of campaign tactics has for some time been recognized by
labor law scholars. 8 '
The court also reasoned that the only method for conducting the
study in an objective manner was by using Excelsior lists. The
argument that the study would interfere with the "laboratory
conditions"82
 deemed essential by the Board in conducting elections
did not persuade the court in Getman. It observed:
[W]e find it impossible to say that disclosure of the Excel-
sior lists would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of employee privacy under Exemption (6). . . The inva-
sion of employee privacy strikes us as very minimal, and
the possible detrimental effects of the study in terms of
delaying the election process as highly speculative. On the
other hand, the study holds out an unusual promise. 83
Although concurring with the majority, Judge MacKinnon
warned that:
Whether appellees' interference in these elections will be
misunderstood and misinterpreted and will cause adverse
reactions is unpredictable at this stage.
My principal concern is for the future. We are here
following the dictates of Congress and are making informa-
tion available for a use that may interfere with the proper
functioning of government. This use may have its
beneficial effects also, but before the good is harvested
considerable turmoil and disruption may result. And this
decision is only the beginning. We may expect similar
wholesale demands for lists of names and addresses from
other persons, not for what they may disclose about the
81 Id. at 675-76, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2105.
82 Id. at 676, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2105. See Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.S. 66, 69-70, 50
L.R.R.M. 1532, 1534-35 (1962).
L 450 F.2d at 677, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2106.
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functioning of government, but for their collateral ability
to aid the person requesting such information."
Thereafter, the Board filed an application with the Supreme
Court to stay the district court's order. Justice Black denied the
application finding "no exception . . . which would authorize
the Board to refuse to turn over the requested records" because the
delivery of the desired records "would interfere with the representa-
tion election procedures" under the LMRA. 85
5. NLRB Manuals
Since enactment of the FOIA the Board has made available to
the public revised versions of most of its current operating manuals.
And the Board is currently revising other manuals which will be
similarly available." In Polymers, Inc., v. NLRB," the only case
involving the issue of Manuals, the Second Circuit supported the
Board's rejection88
 of the employer's objections to an election be-
cause it could not obtain a copy of the agency's manual, "Guide to
the Conduct of Elections". It held applicable to this issue the second
exemption of Section 552(b), which relates to internal rules and
practices guiding the staff. 89 The court noted that the "Guide" was
"an internal advisory document" used by agency staff and played
"no significant role in the Board's adjudication of election
disputes." 9 ° The court relied upon the House of Representatives'
Report on the exemption that it covered "rolperating rules,
guidelines, and manuals of procedure for government investigators
or examiners."91
 But the court warned the Board: "We do not hold
that under no circumstances would the Board be required to pro
duce the Guide; but in the context of the instant case we will not
disturb the refusal of the Board to produce the Guide." 92
Although we have discussed litigation involving the NLRB and
the FOIA, we do not wish to leave the impression that the NLRB
has refused to furnish data to parties except under court orders.
Indeed, the Board has supplied various types of information to
members of the public (mostly labor lawyers) so long as the data was
04 Id. at 680-81, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2108 (concurring opinion).
85 NLRB v. Getman, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971).	 •
86 It should be noted at this point, particularly for those unfamiliar with the practice of
labor law, that since a large number of practicing labor lawyers formerly worked for the
NLRB they either retained NLRB manuals when they left the agency or copied critical
passages for private use.
87 414 F.2d 999, 71 L.R.R.M. 3107 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1010 (1970).
BS Teamsters Local 597 (Polymers, Inc.), 170 N.L.R.B. 333, 67 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1968).
89 . 414 F.2d at 1006, 71 L.R.R.M. at 3111.
981 Id.
91 Id., citing H. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
92 Id.
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not exempted by the FOIA. It supplies copies of public documents
(charges, complaints, election results, informal settlement agree-
ments), makes available for daily inspection in each regional office a
list of all charges and petitions filed, and will, for a reasonable
charge, assemble categories of cases involving identified parties. Not
infrequently, lawyers engaged in non-Board litigation seek
publicly-available information and documents from NLRB files. In
many ways the agency has taken various steps to implement both
the letter and spirit of the FOIA and the consequence has been the
dissemination of substantial information and documents to the pub-
lic.
ANALYSIS
It is clear that the thrust of the FOIA is to increase every
citizen's access to government records. It is similarly clear that the
courts have interpreted the FOIA to require agencies to follow a
liberal disclosure path, limited only by the specific, narrowly con-
strued exemptions. The undergirding, unexpressed premise is that if
federal agencies treat the public unfairly by denying it access to
information, they are undermining the democratic principles of the
"rule of law," "substantive due process," "equal protection under
the law," and other such Lockean requisites of representative gov-
ernment.
The critical role of federal agencies, characterized by some as
the "fourth branch of government," as well as the powers exercised
by those agencies, impelled Congress to make agency records as
open as is consistent with their operating responsibilities. No two
agencies are alike and each operates in a different climate. In each
agency a separate balance must be struck between the effective
operations of that agency and the desire to make known to the
public the operations of the agency. We have discussed the efforts of
the NLRB and the courts to strike a consistent balance, through
litigation, between the protection of all interests and the effort to
make the fullest responsible disclosure. Certain themes which war-
rant comment have begun to arise from the litigation.
Clearly, in almost every case discussed, the courts have categor-
ically rejected impeding the Board proceeding by injunctive relief,
while FOIA claims are adjusted through court litigation. And in-
deed even where such claims for FOIA information have prevailed,
as in Automobile Club of Missouri, 93
 the courts have been most
concerned with preventing an extended delay of Board proceedings
which would cause hardship on other parties while the Board col-
" 84 L.R.R.M. 2423 (D.D.C. 1973).
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lected and prepared the necessary information. The courts in such
circumstances have sought to find temporary short-term remedies to
supply the needs of the complaining party. This appears to be a
reasonable approach since it prevents the use of FOIA litigation as a
delaying tactic, permits the Board to process matters promptly, and
at the same time, impels the Board to comply promptly and dili-
gently with court orders to furnish certain information.
The Board not only must comply with the FOIA, but also, like
the courts, must guard the privacy of witnesses prior to formal
proceedings as well as the confidentiality of agency files. No court
has questioned the right of the Board not to reveal such informa-
tion. However, when it is ordered to furnish Advice and Appeals
memoranda, both privacy and confidentiality are jeopardized.
These memoranda identify specific witnesses, contain staff credibil-
ity findings, and detail the General Counsel's theory warranting
complaint or dismissal of the charges.
Perhaps a reasonable approach to maintaining the sensitive
balance in pending cases would be to excise from the memoranda
everything but the factual findings, legal conclusions, and relevant
precedents. Making available memoranda in their current style,
form, and content could hinder the Board's operations in various
ways, such as: limiting candid exchanges between agency personnel;
impairing the confidentiality of Board investigations; and limiting
agency discretion and flexibility in developing alternate remedies
and legal theories. Another consequence of publicizing these
memoranda would be to provide an advantage to respondents in
unfair labor practice proceedings. Under present Board practice,
without pre-trial disclosure, respondents, armed with these
memoranda, would have an advantage not shared by agency trial
lawyers.
Although we have indicated several unfavorable consequences
likely to flow from making public these memoranda we should not
exclude the possibility of at least one positive result. Aware of the
facts and legal theories undergirding the General Counsel's case,
respondents may approach settlements more realistically. Thus,
more settlements may be obtained as a result of publicizing the
memoranda.
A corollary of the foregoing type of disclosure of Advice and
Appeals memoranda would be furnishing them where trials have
been completed. At the trial most of the witnesses and their tes-
timony would have been disclosed publicly, and the General
Counsel's theory of the case would have been conveyed to all parties
and to the Administrative Law Judge. Even this seemingly appeal-
ing approach intended to achieve a balance -between access and
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privacy contains dangers. The memoranda would reveal the names
of witnesses and their testimony even if they were not called as
witnesses. Employees could be reluctant to come forward if they
knew that their testimony could be prematurely disclosed to em-
ployers or unions, especially if it were known that critical analysis of
their statements, normally contained in memoranda, would be re-
vealed to the public. No one likes to be called a liar in public. Such
analysis should remain confidential for a reasonable number of years
after the case is closed. Hard feelings arising from unfair labor
practice allegations do not dissipate rapidly. Further, these
memoranda frequently refer to correspondence and unsworn infor-
mation from various individuals whose privacy and confidentiality
would be impaired if such "old" memoranda were made available.
It is obvious from the foregoing that public access to such
memoranda is fraught with serious consequences both for those
individuals and for the responsibilities of the NLRB.
There is no serious opposition to publicizing these memoranda
in closed cases. Indeed, the General Counsel is preparing an index
of them. But this may provide practitioners with another means of
affecting General Counsel's action. The Board, not the General
Counsel, decides finally the substantive law. Little would be gained
by reviewing memoranda in cases not reaching the Board for deter-
mination. However, practitioners could use the index as a tool to
check the consistency or inconsistency of General Counsel's refusal
to issue complaints by showing that he is not following principles
established in prior cases. Since the General Counsel's authority to
decline to issue complaints is generally unreviewable by the courts,
his asserted failure to follow the law set forth in the index could
provide practitioners with grounds (arbitrary and capricious) for
challenging the General Counsel in collateral Board proceedings.
Indexing directors' decisions involves neither privacy nor
confidentiality. The delegation by the Board to directors, under the
1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments, to decide representation cases
was intended to expedite the resolution of questions concerning
representation. This has been achieved and everyone involved ap-
plauds the directors' fine record in this area. Will such an index
contribute to better decisions, however "better" is defined? Will it
slow down the proceedings? Will these decisions constitute prece-
dents for the Board, or precedents for other directors?
However one views the purpose and use of such an index, one
consequence may be delay. At present the Board adheres to its
position that directors' decisions have no precedential value. It will
only review a directors' decisions if they contain novel issues or are a
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"departure from officially reported Board precedent." 94 However, it
is uncertain how long the Board would be able to maintain such a
posture, especially when challenged by practitioners in the courts,
i.e., consider how employers have successfully forced court review
of "unreviewable" Board representation decisions by refusing to
bargain with a certified union. If the Board and directors were
forced to consider as precedent all directors' decisions (about 1,900
annually) issuing decisions would take more time. Directors would
have to consider other directors' decisions to avoid inconsistent
findings and conclusions; the Board would have the comparable
task with respect to all directors' decisions; and all parties would
face the same chore. Since the expedited processing of representa-
tion cases is so crucial for everyone, any action impeding this would
be dysfunctional. However, we should resist the temptation of dire
predictions, because federal agencies, like all organizations, usually
find the means to accommodate performance of established tasks
with new statutory obligations.
A review of NLRB litigation under the FOIA reveals that the
District of Columbia courts have been most zealous in requiring
the NLRB to furnish information. Why this happened is beyond the
scope of this article. But the fact is important since the Board
resides in Washington, D.C. where most of the litigation has oc-
curred. We should expect, therefore, that litigants will continue
filing actions to force the Board to make available publicly more and
more information and documents. For whatever reasons, the board
has voluntarily provided access to the public to materials hitherto
unavailable. A comprehensive Field Manual containing the agency's
principal operating procedure can be purchased by anyone. The
Board is currently bringing up to date other manuals for public
dissemination. Although the Board successfully resisted furnishing
to a party its internal manual, "Guide to the Conduct of Elections,"
in the Polymers 95 case, it is preparing a public manual in the
representation area and is planning to make available publicly other
procedural manuals.
Our system of government recognizes and accepts no absolute
rights and seeks to balance equally valid statutory goals. We try to
reconcile forces of change and innovation with those of prudence
and continuity. A fair appraisal of the Board's responses to the
FOIA supports the conclusion that it has achieved a reasonable
accommodation between the LMRA and the FOIA. Citizens have
access to a substantial volume of NLRB materials and more are
" 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c)(1) (1973).
95 414 F.2d 999, 71 L,R.R.M. 3107 (2d Cir. 1969).
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being made available voluntarily and as a result of litigation. Not
everyone is satisfied: neither the special clientele as the largest
consumers of the Board's public services, nor the Board, which
must consider privacy, confidentiality and possible impairment of its
operating duties. Opening up agency records is part of a broad
movement enlarging the citizen's right to know, and the NLRB's
record demonstrates constructive implementation of this right.
EMERGING THEMES
Having reviewed and analyzed litigation involving the NLRB
and the FOIA, we feel that principal notions deserve comment.
Prescinding from the latter, we should clear the underbrush by
noting that the goodness or badness of the FOIA is not relevant.
Congress enacted the law in the public interest and federal agencies
are required to implement it.
As always, differences regarding interpretation and application
of the FOIA are bound to arise and the courts are called upon in
specific cases to adjudicate between a party and a federal agency.
Out of this elucidating process various principles and standards
evolve. These are guides and constraints for parties and agencies,
and a body of law is built for application to particular situations in
our dynamic society. Just as certain procedures and legal principles
become part of the structure and terrain determining what informa-
tion parties may or may not obtain from the NLRB, so it is virtually
inevitable that unforeseen and untoward consequences will flow
from the administration of any new law.
One of the clearest results has been the strategic use of the
FOIA by parties seeking to delay, or impede, if not frustrate, NLRB
actions. As the cases illustrate, at some point in an NLRB proceed-
ing a respondent demands documentary information and not infre-
quently asks the court to enjoin further NLRB action pending
production of the requested documents. This ancillary litigation
compels the Board to divert its scarce resources to respond to the
suit and may postpone the ongoing NLRB proceeding.
Respondents would challenge this observation with the asser-
tion that, if the Board had made available earlier the sought-after
data, the respondent would not have to sue to obtain the docu-
ments. Yet, the Board has made public a substantial amount of
materials since passage of the FOIA. Apparently, there is a continu-
ing race between what the Board places in the public realm and
what specific parties want. And we suspect that it is the nature of
our administrative and judicial processes that such races never end.
Although the Board and charging parties may consider such
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litigation strategic and dilatory, these suits have a positive conse-
quence. As a result of the FOIA and in anticipation of demands for
information, the NLRB is nudged, if not pushed, to re-examine its
internal decision-making processes and memoranda. Whether under
the FOIA, and particularly under the exemptions, a document is
"internal" or a "final determination" becomes crucial since if it falls
into the latter category the public has a right to obtain it. Hence, the
Board will have to rationalize and revise its internal processes and
memoranda. This should not only enhance the public's right-to-
know, a foundation of our civil rights, but should also impel the
Board to streamline and bring up, to date obsolete and vestigial
internal procedures and documents.
Another positive result of the FOIA is illustrated by the action
initiated by Professors Goldberg and Getman. They were engaged in
a substantial and significant empirical study of the behavior of
voters in NLRB elections. The court's decision ordering the Board
to make available Excelsior lists facilitated their study. But more
importantly it demonstrated to everyone, particularly responsible
scholars, that vital data in the NLRB's possession would be given to
further objective studies. 96 This action should encourage others to
develop empirical studies on the impact of the LMRA, a neglected
area. 97
Lest the impression emerge from the litigation that the Board
has resisted complying with the language and spirit of the FOIA, we
want to emphasize that the agency has always made public substan-
tial amounts of materials. Its annual reports are a rich reservoir of
information and contain detailed statistical tables. Its monthly elec-
tion reports and its quarterly reports on case developments provide
rich sources of information and records of the agency's internal
decisions. And the Board regularly complies with specific requests
for data consistent with its responsibilities and the FOIA.
The FOIA requires the NLRB to draw a reasonable
balance among the following: protecting the confidentiality
of its files, fulfilling its operational responsibilities, and providing
the public with certain documents. Each is a crucial obligation and
accommodating all three is a vexing, delicate task. They are inter-
twined. For example, Appeals and Advice memoranda contain refer-
ence to and quotes from affidavits furnished by people not directly
96
 However, not all requests for the lists emanate from responsible and accredited
scholars. Local unions, not involved in the specific elections, have asked the NLRB to furnish
"old" Excelsior lists to assist such unions in their organizing campaigns. Up to now the Board
has not complied with these requests, The operational problems and policy implications of
furnishing these lists are serious and troublesome.
97
 Samoff, Research on National Labor Relations Board Decisions, 10 Ind. & Lab, Rel.
Rev. 108 (1956).
1289
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
involved. Should their names and testimony be revealed? Does the
"special public" have a right to this information? Consider the
invasion of their privacy and impairment of agency investigations!
On the other hand, providing indices of directors' decisions would
not have any of the above consequences. Similarly, making availa-
ble NLRB data to responsible scholars with appropriate safeguards
would neither invade privacy nor impair agency tasks.
To maintain a reasonable and prudent balance, the NLRB
must look to the public and clientele for understanding and coopera-
tion. And in carrying out its responsibilities the Board must be
conscious of the overseeing courts. All, therefore,—the NLRB, the
public, the clientele (unions and management) and the courts—are
involved in this balancing process. If each acts only in its own
self-interest to gain a selfish advantage, then the future will witness
resistance, delay, strategic maneuvering and unachievable demands.
The FOIA is part of an historical legislative development to
provide the public with access to agency documents. It seems to us a
constructive move in enlarging the corpus of our civil rights. This
should be welcomed by everyone, even though it raises difficulties
for federal officials who may prefer less airing. Let all of us, federal
officials, judges, individuals and management and union lawyers,
use the FOIA and the NLRB in the public interest, for we are all
citizens of one large community.
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